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INTRODUCTION 
The rise and fall of the Employee Free Choice Act 
(“EFCA”)1 has been one of the hottest topics in labor law in 
the past few decades.  With the Democrats losing their 
majority in the U.S. House of Representatives in the 2010 
midterm elections and watching their majority in the U.S. 
Senate shrink, the prospects of the proposed EFCA becoming 
legislation have become far less likely.2  Before the 2010 
midterm elections, the potential passage of the EFCA 
provoked several States to try and undercut the impact the 
legislation would have.3  Four States, specifically Arizona,4 
South Carolina,5 South Dakota,6 and Utah,7 enacted state 
constitutional amendments in 2010 that protected an 
employee’s right to a secret ballot election during union 
representation elections.8  On January 14, 2011, the Acting 
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board 
 
 1. The EFCA is a piece of proposed legislation that would make the 
voluntary recognition procedure, one of the tools employees can use to select a 
union as their bargaining representative, more favorable to unions.  See infra 
Part II.A.  Furthermore, the proposed bill also includes other provisions that 
would be favorable to unions.  See infra Part II.A.  Some of those provisions 
would impose timelines on management to negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement with a union.  See infra Part II.A.  If those timelines were not met, 
the dispute would go to an alternative dispute resolution proceeding, including 
binding arbitration.  See infra Part II.A. 
 2. See infra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Jay Sumner, Four States Approve Constitutional Amendments 
Guaranteeing Right to Secret Ballot Union Elections, LAB. REL. COUNS. (Nov. 
04, 2010), available at http://www.laborrelationscounsel.com/efca/four-states- 
approve-constitutional-amendments-guaranteeing-right-to-secret-ballot-union-
elections/.  
 4. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 37 (“The right to vote by secret ballot for employee 
representation is fundamental and shall be guaranteed where local, state or 
federal law permits or requires elections, designations or authorizations for 
employee representation.”).  
 5. S.C. CONST. art. II, § 12 (“The fundamental right of an individual to vote 
by secret ballot is guaranteed for a designation, a selection, or an authorization 
for employee representation by a labor organization.”).  
 6. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 28 (“The rights of individuals to vote by secret 
ballot is fundamental.  If any state or federal law requires or permits an election 
for public office, for any initiative or referendum, or for any designation or 
authorization of employee representation, the right of any individual to vote by 
secret ballot shall be guaranteed.”).  
 7. UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 1 (“All elections, including elections under 
state or federal law for public office, on an initiative or referendum, or to 
designate or authorize employee representation or individual representation, 
shall be by secret ballot.”).  
 8. See Sumner, supra note 3.  
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(“NLRB” or “the Board”) contacted the Attorneys General of 
these four States informing them that the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”) preempts any state law requiring the 
use of secret ballots in union representation elections.9  These 
letters requested responses from each of the States in two 
weeks.10  The Acting General Counsel indicated that the 
NLRB would initiate civil actions in federal court to have the 
state constitutional amendments invalidated if each state did 
not acknowledge that its respective constitutional 
amendment was preempted.11 
In response, these four Attorneys General wrote a joint 
letter back to the Acting General Counsel of the NLRB on 
January 27, 2011.12  They rejected the NLRB’s demands to 
“stipulate to the unconstitutionality” of the state 
constitutional amendments.13  The Attorneys General argued 
that these state constitutional amendments protected “long 
existing federal rights” and that they would “vigorously 
defend any legal attack upon them.”14  The letter emphasized 
that the state constitutional amendments were consistent 
with current federal law.15  The Acting General Counsel of the 
NLRB then responded on February 22, 2011 to the letter from 
the four Attorneys General, stating in the letter: 
As you have unanimously expressed the opinion that the 
State Amendments can all be construed in a manner 
consistent with federal law, I believe your letter may 
provide a basis upon which this matter can be resolved 
without the necessity of costly litigation.  My staff will 
shortly be in contact with the staff members you have 
designated to explore this issue further.16 
 
 9. See NLRB, NLRB Advises Four States that Constitutional Amendments 
Conflict with Federal Labor Law, NLRB.GOV, http://www.nlrb.gov/news-
media/backgrounders/state-amendments-and-preemption (last visited Mar. 28, 
2012) (linking to each of the four letters); Seth Borden, NLRB Asserts State 
Secret Ballot Laws Are Unconstitutional, LAB. REL. TODAY (Jan. 16, 2010), 
http://www.laborrelationstoday.com/2011/01/articles/nlra/nlrb-asserts-state-
secret-ballot-laws-are-unconstitutional/. 
 10. See sources cited supra note 9.  
 11. See sources cited supra note 9.  
 12. Letter from State Attorneys General to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General 
Counsel, NLRB 1 (Jan. 27, 2011), available at http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/ 
cmsdocuments/nlrb012711.sol.pdf.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. See id. at 1–2.  
 16. Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel, NLRB, to State 
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However, on April 22, 2011, the Acting General Counsel 
informed the four Attorneys General that the NLRB would 
initiate lawsuits in Arizona and South Dakota.17  On May 6, 
2011, the NLRB initiated litigation against the state of 
Arizona regarding its amendment.18  More litigation will 
likely follow suit against the other States. 
This Article will use this conflict between the NLRB and 
these four States to analyze many of the issues surrounding 
the EFCA, voluntary recognition, and labor preemption in 
general.  The Article will also discuss some new regulations 
proposed by the NLRB that have reignited the debate over 
the EFCA to some extent.  Lastly, the Article will examine 
the likely resolution of the preemption issue raised by these 
state constitutional amendments.  Part I of this Article will 
discuss the voluntary recognition procedure and the 
recognition bar, including the effects the In re Dana Corp.19 
decision had on the recognition bar and the state of the 
recognition bar after the NLRB recently overruled In re Dana 
Corp.  Part I will also discuss some newly proposed NLRB 
regulations that will have a significant impact on union 
recognition determinations. 
Part II will address the terms of the EFCA to the extent 
that they affect voluntary recognition and the policy 
arguments for and against the act’s implementation.  Part III 
of this Article will look at the congressional history of the 
EFCA.  Part IV will examine preemption generally and the 
various preemption doctrines in the area of labor law.  Part V 
will assess the preemptive effects the NLRA has on these 
state constitutional amendments providing a right to a secret 
ballot election in the context of union representation.  Given 
the lengthy history of federal regulation of labor-management 
relations and a long track record of federal courts finding 
 
Attorneys General 1 (Feb. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/feb_2_letter.pdf.  
 17. Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel, NLRB, to State 
Attorneys General 1 (Apr. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/april_22_letter_from_gc_t
o_states.pdf (“After carefully considering your responses to my letters and in 
view of the seeming impossibility of settling this dispute without litigation, I 
have directed my staff to initiate lawsuits in federal court . . . .”).  
 18. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1–5, NLRB v. Arizona, (D. Ariz. 
May 6, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/234/azcomplaint.pdf.  
 19. In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007).  
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state labor laws preempted if they would undermine the 
NLRA, preemption in the area of labor law is the norm rather 
than the exception.20  The NLRB will likely be successful in 
challenging these state constitutional amendments as 
preempted under the NLRA. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION 
PROCEDURE 
Employees seeking union representation may take 
advantage of two primary routes to secure union 
representation: (1) an NLRB conducted election; or (2) 
voluntary recognition.21  After watching union membership 
steadily decline in the second half of the twentieth century 
and experiencing a frustration with the process of NLRB 
conducted elections, voluntary recognition in the past decade 
has increasingly become the preferred route for union 
certification.22  However, some newly proposed NLRB 
regulations may make an NLRB conducted election a more 
desirable option for unions.23  First, this section will discuss 
the voluntary recognition procedure in general.  Second, this 
section will examine the recognition bar to an NLRB 
conducted election and the effect the recent Dana Corp. 
decision has had on this bar.  Third, this section will address 
some new rules proposed by the NLRB that will have a 
significant impact on current union recognition procedures. 
 
 
 20. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1572–74 (2002) (“Garmon and Machinists together 
virtually banish states and localities from the field of labor relations.” (citing to 
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) and Lodge 76, 
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 
(1976)); infra Part IV. 
 21. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304–06 
(1974); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596–98 (1969).  
 22. James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: 
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 825–30; Laura J. 
Cooper, Privatizing Labor Law: Neutrality/Card Check Agreements and the 
Role of the Arbitrator, 83 IND. L.J. 1589, 1591 (2008); Joel Dillard & Jennifer 
Dillard, Fetishizing the Electoral Process: The National Labor Relations Board’s 
Problematic Embrace of Electoral Formalism, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 819, 
819 (2008) (“The success of these unions [who have had success with voluntary 
recognition] has led most unions to largely reject the slow, cumbersome, and 
ineffective Board processes for obtaining legal representation of the 
employees.”).  
 23. See infra Part I.C. 
10_WALTERS FINAL.DOC 9/5/2012  10:41:47 AM 
1036 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
A. Voluntary Recognition as an Alternative to an NLRB 
Conducted Election 
Section 9(a) of the NLRA allows unions to obtain 
authorization to act as the exclusive bargaining agents for 
employees without NLRB conducted elections when they are 
“designated or selected” as representatives by a majority of 
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.24  This language 
has been interpreted by the NLRB and the Supreme Court as 
authorizing union representation through means other than 
NLRB conducted elections.25  While recognizing the place 
voluntary recognition has in the NLRA statutory scheme, the 
United States Supreme Court and the NLRB have both 
shown a preference for NLRB conducted elections.26  The 
degree of this preference among the individual NLRB 
members can vary significantly as revealed by the deep 
division between the majority and the dissent in the recent 
Dana Corp. decision.27 
As a method of obtaining union representation, voluntary 
recognition is the primary alternative to an NLRB conducted 
election.28  A union can obtain voluntary recognition from an 
employer to act as an exclusive bargaining agent by 
demonstrating to the employer that the union has obtained 
the majority support of the employees.29  A union can make 
this demonstration to an employer by presenting to the 
 
 24. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (“Representatives designated or selected 
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a 
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all 
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to 
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment 
 . . . .”).  
 25. See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 304–06; Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596–98.  
 26. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596; In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 438–41 
(2007).  
 27. Compare In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 438–40 (criticizing the 
pressure imposed on employees by unions in the voluntary recognition 
procedure, misinformation by unions in voluntary recognition drives, and the 
unreliability of authorization cards compared with secret ballots), with id. at 
444–50 (Liebman and Walsh, dissenting in part) (“Voluntary recognition is ‘a 
favored element of national labor policy.’  Yet, the majority decision relegates 
voluntary recognition to disfavored status by allowing a minority of employees 
to hijack the bargaining process just as it is getting started.  Ultimately, the 
majority decision effectively discourages voluntary recognition altogether.”). 
 28. See Dillard & Dillard, supra note 22, at 819. 
 29. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596; MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 407 (6th ed. 2007). 
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employer cards bearing a majority of the employees’ 
signatures within the bargaining unit or through some other 
appropriate method.30  When using cards, the cards must be 
unambiguous in that they state on their face that the signer 
authorizes the union to represent the employee for collective 
bargaining purposes and not to seek an election.31  An 
employer always has the right to refuse to voluntarily 
recognize a union and demand an election32 but can agree 
voluntarily to relinquish this right.33 
As part of the voluntary recognition process, the 
prospective union may ask the employer to sign a card check 
agreement and/or a neutrality agreement.34  Under a card 
check agreement, the employer agrees that if the union 
obtains cards from a majority of employees in the bargaining 
unit authorizing the union to represent the employee that the 
employer will recognize and bargain with the union.35  The 
employer also agrees as part of a card check agreement to 
forego its legal right to insist upon an NLRB conducted 
election.36  Under a neutrality agreement, the employer 
agrees that if the union seeks to organize its employees that 
the employer will remain neutral while its employees decide 
whether they want union representation.37  More specifically, 
the employer declines to exercise certain rights to 
communicate with employees that it would otherwise enjoy 
under the NLRA and potentially allows the prospective union 
means of access to and communication with employees that 
the employer would not be required to permit under the 
NLRA.38  The exact extent of neutrality an employer agrees to 
maintain and the degree to which the employer preserves or 
 
 30. See sources cited supra note 29.  Other methods unions and employers 
have used in the past include methods “as informal as employees walking into 
the owner’s office and stating they wish to be represented by a union and formal 
as a secret-ballot election conducted by a third party such as the American 
Arbitration Association.”  In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 3 
(2011) (citations omitted).  
 31. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 597.     
 32. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309–10 
(1974).  
 33. Cooper, supra note 22, at 1590–91.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1590.  
 38. Id.  
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waives various means of communication with the employees 
can vary significantly depending on the particular 
agreement.39 
Prospective unions often desire these types of agreements 
for several reasons: (1) the effect employer campaigning and 
interaction with employees has on the ultimate outcome of a 
union campaign;40 (2) the general advantage employers have 
when it comes to access to their employees;41 (3) the 
longstanding conflict a bitter campaign between a union and 
the employer can breed in the workplace;42 and (4) the success 
many unions have had with voluntary recognition as opposed 
to NLRB conducted elections.43  Additionally, some studies 
have indicated that employers and unions have a higher 
chance of quickly finalizing a collective bargaining agreement 
when they take advantage of voluntary recognition as 
opposed to using an NLRB conducted election.44 
 
 39. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under 
Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 47 
(2001) (compiling 118 employer neutrality agreements and comparing the types 
of provisions that appear in each agreement). 
 40. See Brudney, supra note 22, at 832–33.  
 41. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006) (“The expressing [by an employer] of 
any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in 
written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of 
an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such 
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”); 
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992) (recognizing that 
nonemployee union members have very limited rights to be on an employer’s 
property); Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 409 (1953) (allowing an 
employer to refuse to allow unions to address employees as part of a captive 
audience and acknowledging that an employer may have captive audience 
meetings). 
 42. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 
(1966) (“Indeed, representation campaigns are frequently characterized by 
bitter and extreme charges, countercharges, unfounded rumors, vituperations, 
personal accusations, misrepresentations and distortions.  Both labor and 
management often speak bluntly and recklessly, embellishing their respective 
positions with imprecatory language.”).  
 43. See supra notes 22–33 and accompanying text. 
 44. See In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 8 n.26 (2011).  The 
NLRB in the Lamons Gasket Co. decision contrasted two studies that examined 
how quickly employers and unions reached collective bargaining agreements 
when using an NLRB conducted election as opposed to the voluntary recognition 
procedure.  See id.  Those studies found that, based on the samplings in the 
studies, an employer and a union finalized negotiations for a collective 
bargaining agreement “within 2 years in only 56 percent of the cases” if an 
NLRB conducted election occurred, as opposed to finalizing a collective 
bargaining agreement “in close to 100 percent of cases” when using the 
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Given that signing one of these agreements typically 
makes it easier for the prospective union to successfully 
become the representative of the employees, the reasons why 
an employer would agree to sign these types of agreements 
are not immediately apparent.45  One benefit to the employer 
is the avoidance of potential economic losses associated with a 
work stoppage, such as a strike or a lockout that could take 
place due to a conflict arising between the employer and 
prospective union during the union campaign.46  Another 
reason is to prevent the disruptive short- and long-term 
effects that a union picketing or handbilling campaign could 
have on the employer’s business.47  The loss of a more 
cooperative workplace culture also motivates some employers 
to sign these agreements.48  Likewise, for employers familiar 
with dealing with unions or for those who project minimal 
cost increases from working with a union, a neutrality 
agreement can sometimes save the employer more money 
compared with the cost of a campaign on union 
representation and the potential conflict involved.49  
Collective bargaining negotiations may be less drawn out and 
costly when an employer agrees to voluntary recognition as 
well, presumably because the union and the employer already 
have a relatively amicable position towards one another.50  
However, some argue that employers sign these agreements 
involuntarily because of harassment by union campaigners.51 
B. The Recognition Bar 
The voluntary recognition bar, normally just called the 
recognition bar, is one of the various bars to an NLRB 
conducted election.52  All of the various bars prevent the 
holding of an NLRB conducted election for a specific 
bargaining unit until a certain period of time (that varies 
among the different bars) passes.53  The primary bars to an 
 
voluntary recognition procedure.  See id. 
 45. Brudney, supra note 22, at 835.  
 46. See id. at 836.  
 47. See id. 
 48. See id.  
 49. See id. at 836–37.  
 50. See Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 8 n.26 (2011).  
 51. Cooper, supra note 22, at 1592.  
 52. See infra notes 54–57, 61. 
 53. See infra notes 54–57, 61 and accompanying text. 
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NLRB conducted election besides the recognition bar include 
the election bar,54 the certification bar,55 the contract bar,56 
and the settlement bar.57  Each of these bars trigger when a 
certain event occurs, such as an NLRB conducted election or 
the certification of a union by the NLRB.58  Once the 
triggering event has occurred, these bars limit for a certain 
period of time the holding of an NLRB conducted election to 
certify or decertify a union.59  Consequently, these bars 
provide some stability and regularity to the relationship 
between labor and management.60 
The recognition bar prevents anyone from requesting an 
NLRB conducted election for the newly represented 
bargaining unit and disallows an employer from withdrawing 
its recognition of a union for a reasonable period of time after 
an employer has voluntarily recognized a union that has 
demonstrated majority support.61  A reasonable period of time 
in this context does not depend on the number of months 
spent bargaining between the employer and the union, but 
 
 54. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (2006) (“No election shall be directed in any 
bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month 
period, a valid election shall have been held.”). 
 55. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98 (1954) (“A certification, if based on 
a Board-conducted election, must be honored for a ‘reasonable’ period, ordinarily 
‘one year,’ in the absence of ‘unusual circumstances.’ ” ).  The certification bar is 
not statutory in nature but instead emanates from the NLRB’s interpretation of 
section 9.  See id. at 98–102.  
 56. See Cind-R-Lite Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1255, 1256 (1979); Appalachian Shale 
Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161–62 (1958).  The contract bar doctrine 
generally bars an election among employees covered by a valid and operative 
collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration.  HARPER ET AL., supra 
note 29, at 385.  The policy behind the contract bar doctrine centers on 
promoting stability in labor relations.  Id. 
 57. See In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 440 (2007) (“At least since Poole 
Foundry & Machine Co., the Board has held that an unfair labor practice 
settlement agreement in which the employer agrees to bargain bars the filing of 
a decertification petition within a reasonable period of time after the 
agreement.” (footnote omitted) (citing Poole Foundry & Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 192 
F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1951))). 
 58. See Brooks, 348 U.S. at 99–104; HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 385. 
 59. See sources cited supra note 58. 
 60. See sources cited supra note 58. 
 61. See Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1 (2011); Keller Plastics 
E., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966).  This particular bar arises from the NLRB’s 
administrative authority rather than any specific requirement contained in the 
NLRA.  Keller Plastics E., 157 N.L.R.B. at 587; In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 
at 434–35; HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 385. 
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rather on what has transpired in the bargaining sessions.62  
The NLRB has further clarified what qualifies as a 
reasonable period of time in a recent decision, specifically 
that it will “be no less than 6 months after the parties’ first 
bargaining session and no more than 1 year.”63  The 
recognition bar always applies to an employer starting from 
the period that the employer voluntarily recognizes the union, 
thus requiring the employer to bargain with the union 
immediately.64  The NLRB’s recent Dana Corp. decision made 
the rules more complex with respect to how the voluntary 
recognition bar applies to the employees within the 
bargaining unit seeking an NLRB conducted election to 
decertify a union or a rival union filing its own election 
petition.65  Although the NLRB has recently overruled that 
decision,66 it is still important to understand the changes 
Dana Corp. made. 
Before the Dana Corp. decision, the recognition bar went 
into effect immediately for all purposes following the 
employer’s voluntary recognition of a union.67  However, the 
NLRB concluded in Dana Corp. that employees within the 
bargaining unit and rival unions should have a forty-five day 
window to challenge the employer’s choice to voluntarily 
recognize the union.68  This window does not begin until the 
affected employees within the bargaining unit receive 
adequate notice of the voluntary recognition and of their 
opportunity to file for an NLRB election.69  After that window 
has passed, the recognition bar goes into effect with respect to 
employees in the bargaining unit and rival unions.70 
 
 62. Livent Realty, 328 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (1999).  
 63. In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 10 (2011).  To 
determine exactly when a reasonable period of time has passed, courts consider 
five factors: (1) whether the parties are bargaining for an initial contract; (2) the 
complexity of the issues being negotiated and of the parties’ bargaining 
processes; (3) the amount of time elapsed since bargaining commenced and the 
number of bargaining sessions; (4) the amount of progress made in negotiations 
and how near the parties are to concluding an agreement; and (5) whether the 
parties are at impasse.  See id. at 10 n.34. 
 64. In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 441–42. 
 65. See id.  
 66. See Lamons Gasket, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1. 
 67. See id.; In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 437 (quoting Keller Plastics 
E., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966)). 
 68. See In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 441–42. 
 69. Id. at 441.  
 70. See id. at 441–42. 
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While the Dana Corp. decision has received a great deal 
of criticism,71 many have also come out in support of it as 
protective of workers’ rights.72  NLRB members Liebman and 
Walsh wrote a scathing dissent to the majority’s decision.73  
These two members criticized the majority’s departure from 
established NLRB precedent dating back to the 1966 decision 
in Keller Plastics Eastern.74  The dissenting members 
continuously pointed out that the majority did not take into 
account one of the key policies underlying the NLRA, 
promoting stability in bargaining relationships.75  Likewise, 
they emphasized that voluntary recognition is “a favored 
element of national labor policy” that the majority was too 
quick to criticize.76  These members articulated that the 
election process leads to many of the same types of pressure 
that the majority found to be unappealing about the 
voluntary recognition process and that the majority’s 
criticisms of the voluntary recognition process could be dealt 
with in more effective ways than how the majority proposed.77 
On August 26, 2011, the NLRB issued its decision in 
Lamons Gasket Co., overruling the Dana Corp. decision.78  In 
a three-to-one decision, the NLRB returned the state of the 
 
 71. See, e.g., Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an 
Era of Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 230 (2010) (“Dana Corp. symbolizes the 
Bush II Board’s vigorous resistance to union organization and signals a new era 
of government repression of unionization.”); Henry M. Willis, Organizing--With 
or Without the NLRB: The Short-Term Prospects for Restoring Workers’ Right to 
Organize, 66 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 115, 117 (2009) (“It is hard to overstate 
the perverseness of that decision’s logic.  Years of dealing with an NLRB that 
was unable to protect workers from anti-union retaliation have driven down the 
number of NLRB-conducted elections by more than 80 percent over the past 
forty years.”).  
 72. See, e.g., N. Mott, Dana Corp and EFCA, NOLA EMPLOYERS BLOG (Sept. 
17, 2010, 6:18 AM), http://nolaemployers.blogspot.com/2010/09/dana-corp-and-
efca.html (“In reality this approach created a rationale safety valve to prevent 
coercive card check tactics. We have argued before unions should have 
embraced this model and should have adopted it as their reform proposal.  It 
would have liberated the labor reform movement from the valid accusation it 
was attempting to eliminate secret ballot elections.”).  
 73. See In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 444–50 (3-2 decision) (Liebman 
and Walsh, dissenting in part).  
 74. See id. at 444 (“[N]othing in the majority’s decision justifies its radical 
departure from that well-settled, judicially approved precedent.”). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at 450 (quoting NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 
750 (7th Cir. 1981)).  
 77. See id. at 444–50. 
 78. See In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1 (2011). 
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recognition bar to what it was before the Dana Corp. 
decision.79  The majority emphasized that Dana Corp. did not 
provide an adequate rationale for its holding and did not rely 
on empirical evidence to support a decision to depart from 
established recognition bar precedent, which dates back to 
1966.80  The majority emphasized that Congress authorized 
voluntary recognition as a valid alternative to an NLRB 
conducted election, a consideration it believed the Dana Corp. 
decision did not adequately take into account.81  The NLRB 
also felt that Dana Corp. created procedures that “placed the 
Board’s thumb decidedly on one side,” the side of employers, 
“of what should be a neutral scale.”82  It also stressed the 
awkwardness of complying with these procedures and their 
unwelcome novelty.83 
The rationale that the Board focused on the most in 
overruling Dana Corp. was the basic policy underlying all of 
the various bars to NLRB conducted elections, that “newly 
created bargaining relationship should be given a reasonable 
chance to succeed before being subject to challenge.”84  The 
majority felt that Dana Corp.’s procedures stressed to an 
improper degree the allegedly coercive nature of the 
voluntary recognition process without taking into account the 
NLRA’s goals of reducing industrial strife.85  The NLRB also 
clarified what qualifies as a reasonable period of time in 
determining the length which the recognition bar applies, 
specifically that it will “be no less than 6 months after the 
parties’ first bargaining session and no more than 1 year.”86  
It adopted the multi-factor test from Lee Lumber & Building 
Material Corp.87 to determine when exactly the recognition 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id.  The NLRB pointed to some information regarding Dana filings it 
had received since the Dana Corp. decision, and noted that these filings 
indicated “employees decertified the voluntarily recognized union under the 
Dana procedures in only 1.2 percent of the total cases in which Dana notices 
were requested.”  Id. at 4. 
 81. See id. at 2–4. 
 82. See id. at 5. 
 83. See id. at 5–6, 9–10 (“In  no other context does the Board require that 
employees be given notice of their right to change their minds about a recent 
exercise of statutory rights.”). 
 84. See id. at 6.  
 85. See id. at 7–10. 
 86. See id. at 10.  
 87. Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 334 N.L.R.B. 399, 402 (2001).  
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bar’s effect ends in a given case.88 
Much like Dana Corp., Lamons Gasket has already 
received significant criticism.  The dissent in Lamons Gasket 
accused the majority of making “a purely ideological policy 
choice, lacking any real empirical support and uninformed by 
agency expertise.”89  One commentator described the opinion 
as one of many chapters in employers’ “summer of discontent” 
spearheaded by the Obama administration.90  The 
congressional House Appropriations Committee has 
threatened to cut off the NLRB’s funding to enforce this 
decision.91  While there is certainly room for disagreement on 
the issues raised in Dana Corp. and Lamons Gasket, it is 
difficult to say that either decision sought to tackle illusory 
problems or that the NLRB overreached its authority by 
overruling Dana Corp.  As the majority in Lamons Gasket 
stressed, Dana Corp. was a rather novel decision that created 
conflicts within a long line of precedent.  Speaking in broad 
terms, the difference between the two opinions boils down to 
the attitude they take towards voluntary recognition as well 
as their emphasis on employee choice versus industrial peace. 
C. Proposed NLRB Regulations Affecting the Union 
Recognition Process 
In a rare exercise of rulemaking power,92 the NLRB 
recently proposed some regulations that would have a 
significant impact on the union election procedures and to a 
lesser extent the voluntary recognition process.93  These 
 
 88. See Lamons Gasket, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 10 & n.34; see sources cited 
supra note 63. 
 89. Lamons Gasket, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 11 (Hayes, dissenting).  
 90. Mark A. Spognardi, Employers’ Summer of Discontent: Obama Labor 
Board Pushes Anti-Employer Agenda, WESTLAW J. EMP., Sept. 20, 2011, at 1. 
 91. See Glenn Spencer, House Appropriations Committee Stands Up Against 
Regulatory Onslaught, WORKFORCE FREEDOM INITIATIVE, 
http://www.workforcefreedom.com/blog/house-appropriations-committee-stands-
against-regulatory-onslaught (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).  
 92. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 
(1998) (“The National Labor Relations Board, uniquely among major federal 
administrative agencies, has chosen to promulgate virtually all the legal rules 
in its field through adjudication rather than rule-making.”).  Indeed, in over 
seventy years, the NLRB has promulgated only one significant substantive rule.  
HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 102. 
 93. Particularly after the Dana Corp. decision, the voluntary recognition 
procedure and NLRB-conducted-election procedure intertwine and overlap in 
many significant ways, so changes to one can impact the other.  See infra Part 
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proposed regulations appeared in the Federal Register on 
June 22, 2011.94  The proposed regulations are generally 
viewed as favorable to unions.95  The stated goals of the 
proposed regulations are as follows: (1) to streamline the 
resolution of questions on union representation; (2) increase 
transparency and the uniformity of these procedures; (3) 
eliminate unnecessary litigation arising out of this process; 
and (4) modify the process by which the NLRB reviews these 
union-representation questions.96  This portion of the Article 
will first discuss why the NLRB decided to implement these 
changes and then outline some of the specifics of these 
proposed regulations. 
The proposed regulations contain a lengthy discussion by 
the NLRB of why it chose to propose these new regulations 
and specific areas where it had seen a need for streamlining 
the representation process.97  The NLRB emphasized that 
Congress intended that there be procedures in place to 
determine questions regarding union representation both 
quickly and fairly.98  The NLRB cited Congress’s findings that 
such procedures would safeguard commerce from disruptions 
and promote industrial peace.99  The Board then pointed to 
various shortcomings in current union representation 
proceedings, particularly with respect to narrowing the issues 
in dispute in representation proceedings.100  The NLRB noted 
that the lack of a requirement for responsive pleadings in 
 
I.A–B.  A more streamlined election procedure may also encourage more unions 
to use that process as opposed to attempting to use voluntary recognition, 
especially when faced with the hurdles of the Dana Corp. decision.  See infra 
Part I.A–B. 
 94. Representation-Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,812, 36,812 (proposed 
June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 101–03).  The NLRB stated that it 
would accept initial comments on the proposed rules until August, 22, 2011.  Id.  
 95. See Steven Greenhouse, N.L.R.B. Rules Would Streamline Unionizing, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2011, at B3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/business/22labor.html.  
 96. Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,812.  
 97. See id. at 36,812–18.  The NLRB also included a lengthy discussion of 
the history and evolution of union recognition procedures.  See id.  A discussion 
of the history of union recognition procedures, beyond what has already been 
addressed in Parts II.A and II.B, is beyond the scope of this Article.  For a 
thorough summary of current representation case procedures, see id. at 36,817–
18.    
 98. Id. at 36,813. 
 99. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).  
 100. See id. at 36,814–16.  
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proceedings regarding representation under section 9 of the 
NLRA allowed a non-petitioning party to not identify and to 
not join the issues they intend to raise at a hearing.101  The 
Board then stated that current regulations also do not 
expressly provide for any form of summary judgment or offer-
of-proof procedures that would allow a hearing officer to 
narrow the issues at a pre-election hearing by determining 
whether there are any genuine disputes as to any material 
facts.102 
The NLRB further identified pre-election disputes over 
individual employees’ eligibility to vote in an election as an 
issue that frustrates the determination of the key inquiry 
that should take place during this period of time, whether a 
question concerning representation exists that an election is 
needed to answer.103   
Technological advances have also proven to be a 
challenge.  Given significant increases in technology and 
newer methods of electronic communication that have come 
into existence, the Board recognized the need for updating its 
rules regarding an employer’s obligation to provide a list of 
names and addresses of eligible employee voters.104  Likewise, 
the Board recognized the need for updating its electronic 
filing procedures to permit the filing of representation 
petitions electronically.105 
A wide variety of new procedural changes appear in these 
proposed regulations.106  To avoid getting lost in the minute 
details of these proposed changes, this Article will focus on 
the most significant aspects of the proposed changes.  With 
respect to initial filing of a petition for certification or 
decertification, the proposed changes would permit parties to 
file petitions for certification or decertification electronically 
and impose additional service requirements on the 
petitioner.107  One of the additional service requirements is 
the filing of a Statement of Position form.108  Failing to file 
 
 101. See id. at 36,814.  
 102. See id. at 36,815. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. at 36,815–16.  
 105. See id. at 36,816.  
 106. See generally id. at 36,818–47. 
 107. See id. at 36,819, 36,835–36.  
 108. See id. at 36,821, 36,838–39.  This form will replace the current NLRB 
Form 5081, the Question on Commerce Information.  See id.  Employers would 
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this form precludes a party from raising certain issues at a 
pre-election hearing and participating in the litigation of 
those issues.109  Non-petitioning parties must also file a 
Statement of Position form before a pre-election hearing.110  
This form would solicit the parties’ position on the following 
issues: (1) the Board’s jurisdiction to process the petition; (2) 
the appropriateness of the petitioned-for bargaining unit; (3) 
any proposed exclusions from the petitioned-for bargaining 
unit; (4) the existence of any bar to the election; (5) the type, 
dates, times, and location of the election; and (6) any other 
issues that a party intends to raise at the pre-election 
hearing.111  Parties that enter into one of the current election 
agreements authorized in 29 C.F.R. § 102.62 that either avoid 
the need for a pre-election hearing or limit the parties’ ability 
to dispute some issues before the election112 would not need to 
file a Statement of Position form.113 
The proposed regulations would also codify and revise the 
requirement initially recognized by the NLRB in In re 
Excelsior Underwear, Inc.114 that an employer must provide 
certain information to the proposed union regarding eligible 
employee voters before an election occurs.115  These changes 
would generally require the employer to provide this 
information in electronic form and reduce the period of time 
that an employer has to provide this list from seven days to 
two days.116  The employer must also follow the same timing 
guidelines when providing this list to the regional director 
and the other parties rather than just file the list with the 
 
additionally be required to file as part of the Statement of Position form the 
information required by the newly codified Excelsior Underwear requirements.  
See id. at 36,821–22, 36,838–39; Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 
1239–40 (1966); infra notes 114–118 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,821, 36,838–
39.   
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. The proposed amendments further clarify the three forms of election 
agreements already in existence under current law by labeling them with their 
current common designations: (1) consent election agreements; (2) stipulated 
election agreements; and (3) full consent election agreements.  See id. at 
36,819–20, 36,837.  
 113. See id. at 36,821, 36,838–39. 
 114. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239–40 (1966).  
 115. See generally Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,820–
21, 36,838, 36,843.  
 116. See id.  
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regional director as under current law.117  Additionally, the 
list must now contain the employees’ email addresses if 
available in addition to their names and physical addresses 
as required under current law.118 
Regarding specific procedures that impact pre-election 
hearings, the proposed amendments provide that, absent 
special circumstances, the regional director must set the 
hearing to begin seven days after service of the notice of 
hearing.119  They also clarify that resolution of disputes 
concerning the eligibility or inclusion of individual employees 
is not ordinarily necessary in order to determine if a question 
of representation exists and thus should not be addressed at 
the pre-election hearing.120  The amendments also narrow the 
scope of evidence that may be offered at hearings to that 
[which is] relevant to any genuine dispute as to any material 
fact.121  They also authorize the hearing officer to play a 
greater role in identifying issues in dispute and determining 
if there are genuine disputes as to facts material to those 
issues.122  As discussed above, the Statement of Position form 
requirements also place significant limitations on the parties’ 
ability to raise any issues at the hearing not raised in their 
Statement of Position form.123 
With respect to appeals, the first major change is that the 
circumstances under which a request for special permission to 
appeal under 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.65 and 102.67 have been 
narrowed in order to avoid piecemeal appeals that would 
disrupt the timely disposition of questions of 
representation.124  Parties filing objections to the conduct of 
the election or to conduct affecting the results of the election 
must also file a written offer of proof in order to demonstrate 
factual support for their objection.125  Lastly, Board review of 
post-election decisions made by one of the regional directors 
 
 117. See id.  
 118. See id. Excelsior Underwear only required that their names and 
addresses be given.  Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239–40.  
 119. Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,821, 36,838.  This 
practice was in the past not uniform among the regions, although some regions 
did follow this practice.  See id. at 36,821.  
 120. See id. at 36,822, 36,839–40.  
 121. See id. at 36,822, 36,841.  
 122. See id. at 36,822–23, 36,841.  
 123. See id. at 36,823, 36,841. 
 124. See id. at 36,822, 36,840, 36,842–43.  
 125. See id. at 36,826, 36,844.  
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would be discretionary rather than mandatory.126 
The NLRB issued a final rule on December 22, 2011.127  
The final rule deferred the final adoption of some aspects of 
the proposed rule.128  Specifically, the Board decided to take 
further time to review the proposed regulations regarding 
“scheduling of the pre-election hearing, the requirement of a 
statement of position, and the content and timing of eligibility 
lists” as well as some other proposed rules.129  The NLRB 
chose to do so because of the particularly large number of 
comments it had received on these proposals.130 
However, the NLRB decided to adopt some of the less 
controversial proposed rules, treating them as severable from 
the other proposed rules.131  The most notable rules it chose to 
adopt include provisions that would: (1) direct that section 
9(c) of the NLRA be construed such that the statutory 
purpose of a pre-election hearing is to determine if a question 
of representation exists; (2) give hearing officers presiding 
over pre-election hearings the authority to limit the 
presentation of evidence to questions of representation; (3) 
give hearing officers presiding over pre-election hearings 
discretion to permit or disallow post-hearing briefs; (4) defer 
all requests for review of the regional director’s decision and 
direction of election until after the election occurs; (5) 
eliminate the codified recommendation that the regional 
director should ordinarily not schedule an election sooner 
than twenty-five days after the decision and direction of 
election; and (6) create a uniform procedure for resolving 
election objections and potentially outcome-determinative 
challenges in stipulated and directed election cases and 
provide that Board review of regional directors’ resolution of 
such disputes is discretionary.132  These changes will go into 
effect on April 30, 2012.133 
Some have compared these changes to a regulatory 
imposition of the EFCA, although the proposed regulations 
 
 126. See id. at 36,827, 36,844–45.  
 127. See Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 80,138 (Dec. 22, 
2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 101–02).  
 128. See id. at 80,140.  
 129. Id.  
 130. See id.  
 131. See id.  
 132. See id. at 80,141.  
 133. See id. at 80,138.  
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are not as favorable to unions as the EFCA would have 
been.134  For example, the proposed rules contain no 
provisions requiring binding arbitration if labor and 
management cannot agree to the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement.135  Furthermore, the EFCA contains 
many more provisions that affect the voluntary recognition 
procedure than these proposed regulations.136  Additionally, 
as some labor supporters have argued, these proposed 
regulations provide no guarantees for union election 
timeframes even though they do in many ways streamline the 
process.137  The terms of the EFCA more concretely allow 
unions to accelerate the process of becoming the exclusive 
bargaining agent for a group of employees.138  Some members 
of Congress proposed trumping these regulations by statute, 
but no such effort has materialized into legislation.139 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE EFCA 
A. Changes to Voluntary Recognition Contained in the EFCA 
According to the preamble of the proposed EFCA bill, the 
EFCA’s purpose is “[t]o amend the National Labor Relations 
Act to establish an efficient system to enable employees to 
form, join, or assist labor organization, to provide for 
mandatory injunctions for unfair labor practices during 
organizing efforts, and for other purposes.”140  Although the 
bill actually predates the Dana Corp. decision, the bill does 
contain language that would have abrogated that decision 
 
 134. Kevin Bogardus, Labor Bill Battle Reborn with NLRB’s New Union 
Election Rules Proposal, THE HILL (June 26, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/168483-labor-bill-battle-reborn-
with-nlrbs-new-union-election-rules.  
 135. Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,812, 36,812–47 (June 
22, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101–103).  The EFCA, on the other 
hand, does contain such a provision.  See H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 
111th Cong. (2009).  
 136. See infra Part II.A; supra notes 82–123. 
 137. Bogardus, supra note 134.  
 138. See infra Part II.A; supra notes 82–123. 
 139. See Seth Borden, NLRB Announces Final Rule to Expedite Elections; 
Senator Announces Effort to Block Rule Via Congressional Resolution, LABOR 
RELATIONS TODAY (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.laborrelationstoday.com 
/2011/12/articles/nlrb-rulemaking/nlrb-announces-final-rule-to-expedite-
elections-senator-announces-effort-to-block-rule-via-congressional-resolution/.  
 140. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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before the NLRB chose to overrule that decision itself.141  
Notably, the EFCA as proposed actually makes the voluntary 
recognition procedure more favorable to unions than it was 
before the Dana Corp. decision.142  Furthermore, the proposed 
bill addresses issues unrelated to the Dana Corp. decision, 
such as imposing various timelines on management to 
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with a union.143 
The main changes that the EFCA would make to the 
voluntary recognition process are: (1) the options an employer 
has once the union has obtained majority support of the 
employees as represented through appropriate cards; (2) the 
involvement of the NLRB in investigating the cards to 
determine if the union has majority support; and (3) the 
abolishment of the changes Dana Corp. made to the 
recognition bar.144  The text of the EFCA that would make 
these changes, amending section 9(c) of the NLRA, is as 
follows: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, 
whenever a petition shall have been filed by an employee 
or group of employees or any individual or labor 
organization acting in their behalf alleging that a majority 
of employees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of 
collective bargaining wish to be represented by an 
individual or labor organization for such purposes, the 
Board shall investigate the petition. If the Board finds 
 
 141. See In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007); Dillard & Dillard, supra 
note 22, at 820 (“In contrast, Congress is considering the Employee Free Choice 
Act (EFCA), which would not only overrule the Board’s decision in 
Dana/Metaldyne but also mandate employer recognition of a union with a card-
check showing of majority support.”) (footnote omitted); infra Part III.  The 
NLRB recently overruled the Dana Corp. decision in In re Lamons Gasket Co.  
See In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1–2 (2011). 
 142. Under current law, an employer can reject a card showing by the union 
that it has obtained majority support and instead seek an NLRB conducted 
election.  See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309–
10 (1974).  The EFCA would change this current law by doing away with an 
employer’s immediate right to challenge a card showing by the union.  See H.R. 
1409, 111th Cong.; S. 560, 111th Cong.  The EFCA would instead place the 
power in the NLRB’s hands to determine if the union has majority support.  See 
H.R. 1409, 111th Cong.; S. 560, 111th Cong. 
 143. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong.; S. 560, 111th Cong.  If management does not 
comply, the dispute would go to an alternative dispute resolution proceeding, 
including binding arbitration.  H.R. 1409, 111th Cong.; S. 560, 111th Cong.  
This Article will not focus on any aspects of the EFCA other than the provisions 
regarding voluntary recognition. 
 144. See sources cited supra note 143. 
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that a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for 
bargaining has signed valid authorizations designating 
the individual or labor organization specified in the 
petition as their bargaining representative and that no 
other individual or labor organization is currently certified 
or recognized as the exclusive representative of any of the 
employees in the unit, the Board shall not direct an 
election but shall certify the individual or labor 
organization as the representative described in subsection 
(a).145 
Essentially, the Board would determine whether or not 
majority support exists, rather than the employer himself.146  
Furthermore, once the NLRB has determined that a majority 
of workers did support the union, the employer could not 
demand the holding of a secret ballot election.147  For 
comparison, any employer who currently signs a card check 
agreement agrees to waive this right to demand an election, 
but employers that have not signed an agreement may 
demand a secret ballot election.148  Lastly, the final sentence 
of this subsection would require that the NLRB certify the 
union immediately once it determines the union has majority 
support.149  Notably, these provisions would effectively 
overrule the result in the Dana Corp. decision.150  Because the 
NLRB has recently overruled Dana Corp., any effects the 
EFCA would have on that decision are of course now moot.151 
B.   Arguments for and Against the EFCA 
Due to the nature of the changes that the EFCA would 
bring about in the labor world as well as the politically 
sensitive nature of the balance of power between 
management and unions, the EFCA has generated a 
significant amount of controversy.  Some of the members of 
Congress who spoke on the congressional floor the day the 
 
 145. See sources cited supra note 143. 
 146. See sources cited supra note 143. 
 147. See sources cited supra note 143. 
 148. See sources cited supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 149. See sources cited supra note 143. 
 150. Dillard & Dillard, supra note 22, at 820 (“In contrast, Congress is 
considering the . . . EFCA[], which would not only overrule the Board’s decision 
in Dana/Metaldyne but also mandate employer recognition of a union with a 
card-check showing of majority support.”). 
 151. See In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1–2 (2011). 
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most recent version of the EFCA was proposed summarized 
the main arguments for and against it.  As stated by 
Representative Stark, the proponents of the EFCA argue that 
it: (1) benefits the economic interests of average Americans as 
well as the economy as a whole; (2) prioritizes the rights of 
individual workers; and (3) curbs some of the worst abuses by 
employers: 
 Middle-class Americans are the backbone of the 
economy, and yet they took a back seat to corporate giants 
over the past eight years.  The previous Administration 
decided to protect big business at the expense of their 
employees, and corporate profits ballooned while real 
worker wages stagnated or even declined. 
 Right now, employers can use coercive tactics in the run-
up to an employer-forced election even when a majority of 
workers want to form a union, they can stall indefinitely 
during contract negotiations, and they can engage in 
illegal labor practices and receive only a slap on the wrist. 
American workers deserve better. 
 The Employee Free Choice Act levels the playing field 
between employees and employers by allowing workers to 
decide whether to hold a NLRB election or instead show 
that a majority of workers support unionization.  The Act 
prevents employers from stonewalling and makes it easier 
for employees to reach a collective bargaining agreement.  
Finally, the Employee Free Choice Act stiffens penalties 
against employers who violate the law. 
 The current economic recession makes passage of the 
Employee Free Choice Act even more important.  Workers 
with higher wages will stimulate the economy, spur 
investment, and get America back on the road to 
prosperity.152 
Proponents of the bill also point to the consistent drop in 
union membership in the United States since the middle of 
the twentieth century from the high point of roughly one-
third of the country’s workers being members of a union.153 
 
 152. 155 CONG. REC. E620 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
Stark). 
 153. See Cooper, supra note 22, at 1591 (“In the mid-1950s union density 
reached its peak, including about a third of the workforce. By the mid-1970s 
density had dropped to about a quarter of the workforce.  Since then, the decline 
has accelerated to the point that union membership in 2007 included only 12.1% 
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On the other hand, critics of the EFCA argue that the 
bill: (1) undercuts the rights of employees by undermining 
secret ballot elections, thus taking away employee autonomy; 
and (2) prioritizes union membership when nationwide union 
membership already stands at a level high enough to 
adequately safeguard workers’ rights.154  As Representative 
Roe articulates, regarding the bill’s effect on workers’ rights, 
“[T]he curiously named Employee Free Choice Act . . . 
actually does the opposite of its title by taking away an 
employee’s free choice to choose in secret whether or not to 
join a union.”155  Likewise, to undercut arguments of waning 
union membership nationwide, Representative Roe pointed to 
recent statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showing 
that “union membership was just over 16 million in 2008, a 
2.6 percent rise over 2007.”156  Another commonly raised 
criticism of the EFCA centers on the economic impact it 
would have on the job market and the economy as a whole.157  
More specifically, opponents of the EFCA argue that the 
legislation would burden employers who are already 
overloaded with government regulations and prevent them 
from creating more jobs in the process.158 
III. CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY OF THE EFCA 
The EFCA has a colorful legislative history in Congress.  
On November 21, 2003, Representative George Miller first 
introduced an early form of the EFCA.159  However, the bill 
and its Senate counterpart never made it out of committee.160  
 
of the workforce.” (footnote omitted)); Dillard & Dillard, supra note 22, at 819.  
In 2010, union membership was approximately 11.9% of the workforce.  News 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members–2010, at 1 (Jan. 21, 2011), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
 154. See 155 CONG. REC. H3111 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2009) (statement of Rep. 
Pitts); id. at H3112–13 (statement of Rep. Roe).  
 155. Id. at H3112 (statement of Rep. Roe).  
 156. Id. 
 157. Kris Maher, Economy Heightens Debate Over Bill to Ease Union 
Organizing, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 2008, at A3, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122549927797489907.html (“Business and 
industry groups say the legislation, known as the Employee Free Choice Act, 
will lead to massive job losses and hobble the economy.”).  
 158. Red Tape and Scissors, ECONOMIST (May 28, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/13686444. 
 159. H.R. 3619, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 160. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-23, at 4 (2007) (Conf. Rep.). 
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The bill once again stalled in committee when reintroduced in 
2005.161  When the bill resurfaced in early 2007, it finally 
made it out of committee and to the full House of 
Representatives.162  The House on March 1, 2007 passed a 
version of the bill by a vote of 241 to 185.163  Shortly 
afterwards, former Senator Ted Kennedy introduced a 
version of the bill in the Senate on March 29, 2007.164  
Republicans successfully filibustered the bill in the Senate 
when a motion to invoke cloture failed to pass by nine votes 
with a final vote of fifty-one to forty-eight.165  On March 10, 
2009, a few months after the 111th Congress was sworn in, 
former Senator Ted Kennedy and Representative George 
Miller both introduced a version of the bill in the Senate and 
House respectively.166 
When reintroduced in 2009, the bill faced the largest 
hurdles in the Senate with the prospect of a potential 
filibuster where Republican opposition to the bill was 
uniform.167  Former Senator Arlen Specter, a moderate 
Republican viewed as key to the passage of the bill, stated in 
March of 2009 that he opposed the legislation.168  Democratic 
Senator Ben Nelson of Nebraska also expressed his opposition 
to the bill.169  Several other Democratic Senators stated that 
they could not support the bill in its current form or that they 
would prefer alternative legislation, including Arkansas 
Senator Blanche Lincoln,170 Delaware Senator Thomas 
 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. at 5. 
 163. 153 CONG. REC. H2091 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2007). 
 164. S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 165. 153 CONG. REC. S8378-98 (daily ed. June 26, 2007).  
 166. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 167. See James Oliphant, ‘Card Check’ Bill Loses Key Supporters, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 28, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/28/nation/na-card-check28 
(“All along, Republicans have made it clear that they would try to stop the bill 
with a filibuster.  Specter’s announcement Tuesday means all forty-one Senate 
Republicans are lined up against the measure.”).  
 168. See id.  Senator Arlen Specter soon switched parties to become a 
Democrat in late April of 2009 after he realized that he could not likely win the 
upcoming Republican primary he faced and that the Republican Party in his 
view had shifted too far rightward politically.  See Carl Hulse, Specter Switches 
Parties, N.Y. TIMES (April 28, 2009, 12:13 pm), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2009/04/28/specter-will-run-as-a-democrat-in-2010/.  
 169. See Ryan Grim, Ben Nelson Opposes Employee Free Choice Act, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2009, 02:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2009/03/10/breaking-ben-nelson-oppos_n_173548.html. 
 170. See Alec MacGillis, Drifting Right, Lincoln Comes Out Against EFCA, 
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Carper,171 and California Senator Dianne Feinstein.172  The 
focus of attention in Congress soon shifted to other 
legislation, such as healthcare overhaul173 and financial 
reform.174  Particularly with the loss of the Democratic super 
majority in the Senate due to the January 2010 special 
election upset in the Massachusetts Senate race following the 
death of Senator Ted Kennedy,175 the original sponsor of the 
bill in the Senate, the prospects of passing the EFCA quickly 
dimmed.176  AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka claimed that 
there would be a push to pass the EFCA in the lame-duck 
session following the Democratic defeats in the 2010 midterm 
elections,177 but no such effort ever materialized into 
legislation in an otherwise active lame duck session.178 
Given the uniform opposition of Republicans to the 
EFCA179 and the results of the 2010 congressional midterm 
elections, the loss of the Democratic majority in the House of 
Representatives and the net loss of seven of sixty seats in the 
U.S. Senate including the Democratic loss in Massachusetts 
in January 2010, little likelihood exists that Congress will 
pass the EFCA in the foreseeable future.180  However, 
 
WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2009, 5:41 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/ 
2009/04/06/report_lincoln_comes_out_again.html.  
 171. Sean Hackbarth, Carper to Oppose Employee Free Choice Act, SENATUS 
(Apr. 15, 2009, 12:29 PM), http://senatus.wordpress.com/2009/04/15/carper-to-
oppose-employee-free-choice-act/. 
 172. See Oliphant, supra note 167.  
 173. See Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Hails Vote on Health 
Care as Answering ‘the Call of History,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/health/policy/22health.html.  
 174. Editorial, Congress Passes Financial Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, 
at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/opinion/16fri1.html.  
 175. See John Fritze, Scott Brown Wins Massachusetts Senate Race, USA 
TODAY (Jan. 19, 2010, 9:44 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ 
onpolitics/post/2010/01/620007121/1.  
 176. Derrick Cain, Harkin Says He Does Not Have Enough Votes to Approve 
EFCA, DAILY LAB. REP., May 14, 2010, at A-8. 
 177. Carter Wood, Card Check: Union Leader Implies Lame-Duck Push for 
EFCA, SHOPFLOOR (Sept. 17, 2010, 10:13 AM), http://shopfloor.org/2010/09/ 
card-check-union-leader-implies-lame-duck-push-for-efca/14558.  
 178. See Laurie Kellman, Lame Duck Session Culminates with Big 
Accomplishments for Democrats, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/23/lame-duck-session-democratic-
accomplishments_n_800654.html.  
 179. See Oliphant, supra note 167.  
 180. See Calvin Woodward, 2010 Midterms Put Democratic Control On the 
Line, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/11/02/election-results-2010-midterms_n_777475.html. 
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voluntary recognition has become a somewhat more desirable 
option for unions now that the NLRB has overruled its 
decision in Dana Corp.181 
IV. PREEMPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF LABOR LAW 
A. The Gradual Federalization of Labor Law and Historical 
Context 
Until the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(“NIRA”) in 1933 and subsequently the NLRA in 1935, States 
primarily regulated labor-management relations and union 
activity.182  However, the role the States played in these areas 
had already begun to decrease in the decades that preceded 
the NIRA and NLRA.  As early as 1898, Congress and various 
federal agencies became involved in regulating union activity 
related to railroad employees.183  In 1914, Congress began to 
tacitly bless the organization of labor unions with the passage 
of the Clayton Act, which provided an antitrust exemption to 
labor organizations and decreased the ability of federal courts 
to issue injunctions in labor disputes.184  Outside of various 
laws passed during wartime, the passage of the Railway 
Labor Act in 1926 marked one of Congress’s most significant 
moves into the area of labor-management relations.185  Lastly, 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 outlawed yellow-dog 
contracts,186 gave greater recognition to a union’s ability to act 
as the representative of an employee, and placed greater 
restrictions on the federal courts’ ability to issue injunctions 
against labor unions.187 
 
 181. See In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1–2 (2011); supra 
Part I.B. 
 182. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 81–82, 905. 
 183. See id. at 78. 
 184. See Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 6, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006)).  The Norris-LaGuardia Act more 
comprehensively deals with injunctions in labor disputes in modern times.  See 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 101–115 (2006)); HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 67. 
 185. See generally Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as 
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2006)); see also HARPER ET AL., supra note 
29, at 67–68. 
 186. Yellow-dog contracts are contracts where an employee agrees not to join 
a union or be involved in union activities during the term of their employment.  
HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 66. 
 187. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. at 70 (codified as amended at 29 
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Once World War I broke out, wartime concerns created a 
stronger federal interest in maintaining stable labor-
management relations.  Following the federal seizure of roads 
in 1917, the Railroad Administration recognized the rights of 
rail workers to organize and bargain collectively in order to 
reduce industrial strife during wartime that could affect 
nationwide transportation.188  Likewise, the need for 
consistent wartime production prompted President Wilson in 
1918 to create the National War Labor Board to prevent labor 
disputes.189  During this wartime period, this agency 
protected workers who sought to organize and bargain 
collectively by enforcing their right to do so.190  The purpose of 
these and other changes at the federal level during this 
period of time more directly related to promoting efficiency 
and peace between labor and management during wartime as 
opposed to promoting union membership and growth.191 
The two key factors that influenced federal intervention 
into the area of labor-management relations in the early 
twentieth century were: (1) the changing dynamics of the 
relationship between employees and employers; and (2) the 
Great Depression.  First, due to the changing dynamics 
between employees and employers, the workplace in the early 
twentieth century became a much different place than it had 
been a century or even several decades earlier.  Around the 
turn of the twentieth century, states began to make their 
corporate laws more favorable to corporations in order to 
attract corporations to register in their state.192  Likewise, the 
size of corporations and other business entities began to grow 
significantly following the Civil War.193 
 
U.S.C. §§ 101–115). 
 188. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 78. 
 189. See BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS: EVENTS, IDEAS AND THE IIRA 82 (2004). 
 190. See id.  Technically speaking, the National War Labor Board did not 
have much in the way of enforcement authority, but President Wilson exercised 
his war powers to secure obedience to its decisions.  See HARPER ET AL., supra 
note 29, at 64. 
 191. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 64.  Notably, after World War I 
during the 1920s, the federal government did take a less active role in 
protecting unions and allowed businesses to exercise a more free hand.  See id. 
 192. See JOHN E. MOYE, THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 159 (6th ed. 
2005); Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875–
1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 667, 667 (1989). 
 193. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 32; KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 16–
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These changes to the basic form of businesses largely 
ended the personal relationship between employers and 
employees that was more typical of smaller enterprises.194  
When coupled with the strong demand for labor in this post-
Civil War period, these changes played a significant role in 
the development of unions and the labor movement in 
America.195  In a more industrialized workplace, employees 
became more fungible thus reducing their individual 
bargaining power.196  Significant increases in the migration of 
employees also created more of a free-labor market.197  
Workers became more willing to leave the countryside for 
larger cities and even to leave their countries and move to 
America for work.198  Additionally, the advent of the factory 
and the use of heavy machinery posed new types of threats 
within the workplace that were foreign or at least less 
prevalent in a pre-industrial economy.199 
Second, the pressure the Great Depression placed on 
American workers arguably played the largest role compared 
to any other factor in the federalization of labor laws.  
National income plummeted from eighty-one billion dollars in 
1929 to forty-nine billion dollars in 1932, with employee 
 
17 (“As home production and artisanal workshops gave way to large-scale 
mines, mills and factories, hundreds of thousands of workers were grouped 
together in one enterprise under the centralized control of an owner and a cadre 
of managers.”). 
 194. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 32; KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 15–
16. 
 195. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 32. 
 196. KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 16.  That is not say that workers did not 
benefit in a variety of ways from these changes that came from 
industrialization.  Commentators sometimes paint an idyllic picture of social 
and economic conditions before this period of industrialization.  See Ludwig von 
Misses, Facts About the “Industrial Revolution,” THE FREEMAN, Feb. 1956, 
reprinted in THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND FREE TRADE 53, 53–54 (Burton 
W. Folsom, Jr. ed., 1996).  However, in spite of some negative effects 
industrialization had on the workplace (in the worst instances egregiously 
negative effects), economic conditions did generally improve for many workers.  
See id. at 53–55.  For example, mass production made goods cheaper for 
everyone, including workers.  See id. at 56.  Likewise, workers received 
significantly higher wages as a result of some of these changes.  See KAUFMAN, 
supra note 189, at 25.  Working hours for workers decreased as well as the 
nineteenth century progressed.  Id.  Workers’ life expectancies also rose.  Id. 
 197. KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 16. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id.  The same was true for other types of workplaces that were 
either foreign to a pre-industrial economy or became more prevalent as a result 
of industrialization, such as railroads and mines.  See id. 
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wages sustaining the greatest losses.200  Private construction 
dropped from $7.5 billion in 1929 to $1.5 billion in 1932.201  
Over fifteen million people were unemployed in 1933, with 
the national unemployment rate at its peak rising to roughly 
twenty-five percent.202  Many businesses tried to avoid wage 
cuts at first, but eventually a variety of industries began to 
make these cuts as the Great Depression deepened.203  These 
conditions led President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to push 
for a variety of reforms as part of the New Deal program after 
his presidential election in 1932.204  The National Industrial 
Recovery Act (“NIRA”) was one of the first and most 
ambitious aspects of the New Deal.205  In addition to 
establishing minimum-wage and maximum-hours standards 
in every industry, the NIRA created a federal statutory right 
for employees to organize themselves into a union.206  
Particularly with respect to the strength of the NLRB, the 
agency charged with enforcing the NLRA, the NLRA was in 
many ways broader and more favorable to employees than the 
NIRA that preceded it.207 
B. Modern Policy Rationales Supporting Labor Law 
Preemption 
With the passage of the NIRA and subsequently the 
NLRA, Congress decided that the area of labor-management 
 
 200. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 80. 
 201. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 87 (2003).  
 202. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 
14–15 (1950); ROBERT FRANK & BEN BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF 
MACROECONOMICS 98 (3d ed. 2007). 
 203. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 80. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. at 81.  The NIRA contained no real mechanisms to handle labor 
disputes.  See id.  Consequently, President Roosevelt created by executive order 
the National Labor Board to conduct representation elections and hold hearings 
to determine whether firms had discriminated against employee organizers.  
See id.  This agency lacked any enforcement authority, however.  Id.  Notably, 
the Supreme Court struck down the NIRA as unconstitutional in 1935.  See 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539–42, 546–51 (1935) 
(striking down key provisions of the NIRA as an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power to the executive branch and as outside the scope of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers).  After Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, the Court 
upheld that statute in 1937.  See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (upholding the NLRA as within Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers); HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 81. 
 207. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 81–83. 
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relations needed uniform federal standards.208  As Justice 
Jackson once articulated in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 
“Congress evidently considered that centralized 
administration of specially designed procedures was 
necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive 
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to 
result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward 
labor controversies.”209  While those who would seek pro-labor 
or pro-business legislation from state legislatures may 
complain about preemption in this area,210 the added cost of 
understanding and complying with fifty different sets of state 
laws would likely undermine any benefits gained from 
increased state regulation.211  All of the following would be 
potential consequences of delegating more power over labor 
policy to the States: (1) compliance costs would rise for 
businesses and unions; (2) attempted compliance with 
inconsistent or conflicting state laws would increase 
uncertainty for businesses and unions; (3) enforcement of 
labor laws would become more difficult due to choice-of-law 
and other multijurisdictional concerns; (4) inconsistency in 
results would increase (potentially dramatically); (5) forum 
 
 208. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 
U.S. 180, 190–95 (1978); HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 905; supra Part IV.A. 
 209. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).  
 210. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 225, 225–27 (2008), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/ 
images/pdfs/659.pdf.  
 211. See id. at 225–26, 228 (“At best, multiple layers of regulations create 
complexities and redundancies that increase compliance costs and make 
enforcement more difficult.  At worst, inconsistencies or outright conflict make 
compliance and enforcement nearly impossible.  Exclusive federal regulation 
would eliminate many of these problems and produce a more effective and 
economically competitive workplace governance regime.”); Garner, 346 U.S. at 
490–91 (“A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as 
apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of 
substantive law.”); David L. Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: 
Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 509 
(1986) (“Centralization of labor policy is essential because the NLRA, despite its 
political defects, is far better suited to anchor and to guide the development of 
labor policy than are the fifty separate states.  If labor policy loses this 
centralization, state courts will yield a volatile checkerboard of inconsistent 
decisions, and labor law practice will disintegrate into raw forum shopping.”).  
However, some would counter that “labor law preemption doctrine exists within 
a bodyguard of exceptions making it at once one of the most complex and 
indecipherable areas in all of employment law.”  Henry H. Drummonds, 
Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Preemption Doctrine to Allow the 
States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REV. 97, 104 (2009). 
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shopping would increase; and (6) the desirability of the 
United States as a place of business would decrease for 
foreign businesses.212 
While it once made sense for States to regulate 
employment practices that were truly local in nature, the 
modern workplace is strikingly different than it once was.213  
A large amount of employers are at least regional in nature, 
and many others are national or international in scope.214  
Comparing a localized dispute, such as a dispute between a 
single employee and his employer over a covenant not to 
compete, to a large-scale labor dispute, which can impact 
hundreds of employees in several different states215 and can 
bring even a large employer’s business to a screeching halt, 
illustrates the point.216  State regulation does have its place 
with respect to many types of employment issues impacting 
concerns that have a more localized effect.217  In comparison, 
the interests that the States have in employment and labor 
policies decreases significantly when it comes to disputes that 
have national and international consequences.218 
Many complain about the politicized nature of federal 
labor policy and the resulting congressional impasse this 
situation creates.219  The point is well taken, but this 
situation is far from a recent phenomenon.220  Additionally, 
significant changes in federal labor law do take place as a 
 
 212. See Gregory, supra note 211, at 509; Hirsch, supra note 210, at 225–26, 
228.  
 213. See Hirsch, supra note 210, at 228; supra notes 192–199 and 
accompanying text. 
 214. See Hirsch, supra note 210, at 228. 
 215. One example would be the highly publicized case where the NLRB 
brought an action against Boeing for retaliating against a union by moving a 
factory from Washington to South Carolina.  See Steven Greenhouse, Boeing 
Labor Dispute Is Making New Factory a Political Football, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 
2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/business/ 
01boeing.html?pagewanted=all.  This dispute, which has since reached a 
resolution, affected at least two states, impacted thousands of workers and one 
of the world’s largest airplane manufacturers, and involved a plant with 
construction costs around $750 million.  See id.; Chris Isidore, Boeing Unfair 
Labor Charge Dropped, CNNMONEY (Dec. 9, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/ 
12/09/news/companies/boeing_nlrb/.  
 216. See Hirsch, supra note 210, at 225–28.  
 217. See id.   
 218. See id.   
 219. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 20, at 1530. 
 220. See id. (stating that no major congressional revision of federal labor 
laws has occurred since 1959). 
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result of adjudications that take place within the NLRB, the 
agency charged with implementing the NLRA, and ultimately 
the federal court system.221  Likewise, politicization of labor 
policy is far from a purely Congressional phenomenon.222  It 
already happens at some level in all states when they shape 
labor and employment laws within the areas that the states 
may permissibly regulate.223  Allowing the states to exercise a 
freer hand in regulating labor policy would simply change the 
forum of this politicized battle rather than eliminate it.  
While the end result in labor policy would of course be 
different given that all fifty states would have the freedom to 
adopt their own labor policy, politicization would not likely 
decrease in any significant way. 
C. Preemption Generally 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
eliminates conflicts between federal and state law by 
establishing that the Constitution and laws of the United 
States will trump conflicting state law.224  It is important at 
the start of a preemption discussion to distinguish between 
the preemption of state substantive law and the preemption 
of state court jurisdiction over federal claims.  Both of these 
types of preemption have particular significance in the field of 
 
 221. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 99–105 (discussing the structure, 
authority, and history of the NLRB). 
 222. One recent example would be the recent battles in various states over 
whether to limit the rights of public sector unions at the state level.  See A. G. 
Sulzberger & Monica Davey, Union Bonds in Wisconsin Begin to Fray, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 22, 2011, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/us/22union.html?pagewanted=all; Ohio 
Senate Votes Restrictions on Public Sector Unions, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2011, 4:57 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/02/us-ohio-unions-vote-idUSTRE 
7217HJ20110302.  In Wisconsin in particular, the debate has turned 
particularly hostile and transformed the political landscape there.  See 
Sulzberger & Davey, supra; Brendan O’Brien, Republican Senators Face Recall 
Vote in Wisconsin, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/08/09/us-wisconsin-recalls-idUSTRE7783VT20110809. 
 223. See sources cited supra note 222.  
 224. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”); Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption When 
There Is An “Emerging Consensus” of State Environmental Law and Policies, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 649, 658 (2008).  
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labor law.  Each of these two types of preemption will be 
discussed separately. 
1. Preemption of State Substantive Law 
Preemption is generally a question of congressional 
intent.225  There is generally a presumption against 
preemption of state substantive law, especially implied 
preemption.226  Federal courts find preemption in 
circumstances where “Congress’ command is explicitly stated 
in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its 
structure and purpose.”227  Preemption takes the form of 
express preemption or implied preemption.228  Courts have 
further identified two types of implied preemption: field 
preemption and conflict preemption.229  The Supreme Court 
has emphasized that the above categories of preemption are 
not rigidly distinct.230  Thus, field preemption may be thought 
of as a species of conflict preemption.231  However, practically 
speaking, it is often easier to conceptualize field preemption 
separately. 
Field preemption occurs when the specific scheme of 
federal regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”232  Field preemption can of course be express 
as well as implied.233  Conflict preemption occurs when either: 
(1) “compliance with both federal and state regulation is a 
physical impossibility”;234 or (2) state law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”235  Thus, the term 
conflict preemption is a bit misleading, as there need not be a 
 
 225. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).  
 226. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Fla. Lime & 
Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 146–52 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1947). 
 227. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).  
 228. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990) 
 229. Learner, supra note 224, at 659.  
 230. English, 496 U.S. at 79–80 n.5. 
 231. See id.  
 232. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
 233. See Henry Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the 
Second Twentieth Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 529 (1993). 
 234. Id. at 531.  
 235. Id. 
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true conflict between the state and federal law in the sense 
that compliance with each law is not possible.236  This second 
prong of conflict preemption is particularly important with 
respect to Garmon237 and Machinists238 preemption.239  
Garmon preemption focuses on conduct protected by NLRA 
section 7 or prohibited by NLRA section 8 while Machinists 
preemption instead looks at conduct neither protected nor 
prohibited by these sections but still outside the scope of 
permissible state regulation.240 
Predicting the result in preemption cases can often be 
difficult.241  However, in the field of labor law, the operation of 
the various labor preemption doctrines as forms of field 
preemption reduces the number of close cases.242  As one 
commentator articulates, courts largely ignore the normal 
presumption against implied preemption in most labor 
preemption cases.243 
2. Preemption of State Court Jurisdiction over Federal 
Claims 
Preemption of state court jurisdiction over federal claims 
is a distinct but related issue to the preemption of state 
substantive law.  Courts are much more willing to find 
preemption of state substantive law than preemption of state 
court jurisdiction over federal claims.244  While federal courts 
 
 236. See id. at 529. 
 237. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union Local 2020 v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236 (1959).  
 238. Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t 
Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).  
 239. See Drummonds, supra note 211, at 163 n.295. 
 240. See infra Part IV.D. 
 241. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000) (noting 
that most commentators view the Court’s “[m]odern preemption jurisprudence 
[as] a muddle”); Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (A) Faithful Agency in the Supreme 
Court’s Preemption Jurisprudence, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 367, 369 (2011) 
(“Although the language used to describe the various preemption analyses 
applied by the Court has remained stable for decades, the Court has struggled 
to provide commensurate levels of outcome predictability in its preemption 
decisions.” (footnote omitted)).  
 242. See infra notes 253–256, 287 and accompanying text. 
 243. Drummonds, supra note 211, at 163 n.295. 
 244. Compare Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990) (recognizing that 
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims under normal 
circumstances unless Congress expressly ousts them of that jurisdiction under 
the Supremacy Clause), with Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 
88, 98 (1992) (recognizing that Congress can impliedly as well as expressly 
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will sometimes find that Congress has impliedly preempted 
state substantive law, federal courts will almost never find 
that Congress has impliedly preempted state court 
jurisdiction over federal claims.245  Congress must almost 
always expressly oust state courts of jurisdiction to hear 
federal claims in order for a federal court to find Congress 
intended such a result.246  Notably, due to some of the 
nuances of the well-pleaded complaint rule, even when 
Congress has expressly preempted state court jurisdiction 
over some types of federal claims, such as patent claims, state 
courts still have jurisdiction over cases in which the 
exclusively federal claim is only a counterclaim.247  Federal 
courts, on the other hand, would not have subject matter 
jurisdiction based on the federal counterclaim alone.248 
In the field of labor law, federal courts are more willing to 
find preemption of state court jurisdiction than they would be 
in most other areas of federal law.249  The Garmon 
preemption doctrine and to a lesser extent the Machinists 
doctrine operate to divest state courts of jurisdiction over 
some types of disputes.250  For purposes of this Article, the 
Garmon preemption doctrine will be the most significant of 
these three preemption doctrines.251 
D. Labor Law Preemption 
There are three key preemption doctrines in the area of 
labor law within the context of the NLRA scheme: (1) Garmon 
preemption; (2) Machinists preemption; and (3) Labor 
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) section 301 
preemption.252  All of these preemption doctrines operate as 
 
preempt state substantive law).  
 245. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823–26 (1990); 
supra note 244.  
 246. See Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 823–26; Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 458–59.  
 247. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (“Nor can federal 
jurisdiction rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim.  We so ruled, 
emphatically, in Holmes Group. Without dissent, the Court held in Holmes 
Group that a federal counterclaim, even when compulsory, does not establish 
‘arising under’ jurisdiction.” (citation omitted) (citing Holmes Grp., Inc. v. 
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002))).  
 248. See id. 
 249. See infra Part IV.D. 
 250. See infra Part IV.D. 
 251. See infra Part V. 
 252. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 
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either express or implied field preemption.253  Garmon and 
Machinists operate as implied field preemption under the 
conflict preemption principle of state law standing as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.254  Section 301 
preemption is a form of express field preemption.255 
One cannot overemphasize how broad some of these labor 
preemption doctrines are.  As one commentator puts it, “It 
would be difficult to find a regime of federal preemption 
broader than the one grounded in the National Labor 
Relations Act.”256  However, Congress has not chosen to fully 
occupy the field of labor relations to the extent it could under 
the Commerce Clause, leaving some issues still subject to 
state regulation.257  One odd characteristic of the area of labor 
preemption is that Congress has remained virtually silent for 
roughly fifty years on the issue of labor preemption even 
though the federal courts have expansively developed these 
labor preemption doctrines.258  Some would argue that these  
labor preemption doctrines have little basis in congressional 
 
208–13 (1985). 
 253. Drummonds, supra note 211, at 163 & n.295. 
 254. See id.;  Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local 
25, 430 U.S. 290, 295 n.5 (1977) (discussing the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction 
under Garmon); Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. 
Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (specifying the general 
contours of Machinists preemption); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s 
Union Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (specifying the general 
contours of Garmon preemption); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 
(1953) (“Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of 
specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its 
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result 
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.”). 
 255. See Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 559–62 (1968).  These types 
of claims can always be heard in federal court as they are always removable, 
but state courts still have jurisdiction over them.  See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. 
Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6–8.  
 256. Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and 
States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (2011). 
 257. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2327 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al., eds., 5th ed. 
2006 & Supp. 2010) [hereinafter DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]. 
 258. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 475 U.S. 608, 622 (1986) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“From the acorns of [two earlier] sensible decisions 
has grown the mighty oak of this Court’s labor preemption doctrine, which 
sweeps ever outward, though still totally uninformed by any express directive 
from Congress.”); Drummonds, supra note 211, at 164.  
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intent.259 
Lastly, section 301 preemption deals with federal 
common law displacing state law interpretation of collective 
bargaining agreements.260  This Article will not focus in any 
detail on section 301 preemption, since the state 
constitutional amendments providing a right to a secret ballot 
election do not implicate this type of preemption. 
1. Garmon Preemption 
With respect to the NLRA, Garmon preemption is the 
oldest and broadest of the preemption doctrines in the field of 
labor law.261  In a nutshell, Garmon preemption prevents the 
state regulation of activities which clearly or that may fairly 
be assumed to be “protected by § 7 of the [NLRA], or 
constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8.”262  Absent a few 
minor provisions within the NLRA, the statute does not 
expressly state the extent to which it displaces state law.263  
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted Congress’ 
preemptive intent under the NLRA quite broadly.264  The 
Court felt that allowing States to regulate various forms of 
labor disputes “so plainly within the central aim of federal 
regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between the 
power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by 
state law.”265 
Instead, the NLRB should in the first instance determine 
whether section 7 or section 8 of the NLRB governs a 
particular activity.266  As a later decision articulated, the 
NLRB has “primary jurisdiction” over these issues.267  In its 
 
 259. See sources cited supra note 258. 
 260. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210–11 (1985). 
 261. See Drummonds, supra note 211, at 165–66. 
 262. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union Local 2020 v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).  
 263. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 257, at 2328; HARPER ET AL., 
supra note 29, at 905. 
 264. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 
490 (1953) (“Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of 
specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its 
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result 
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.”). 
 265. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. 
 266. See id. at 244–45. 
 267. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local 25, 430 
U.S. 290, 295 n.5 (1977). 
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operation, the Garmon preemption doctrine preempts both 
state substantive law and state court jurisdiction over 
disputes that fall within the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction.268  
Despite Garmon’s relative age, the Supreme Court and the 
lower federal courts still cite Garmon as a leading precedent 
for one of the three basic labor law preemption doctrines.269 
As with the application of many other types of 
preemption, determining the exact scope of Garmon 
preemption does not lend itself to a precise analysis.  As 
stated in Garmon, conduct “protected by § 7 of the [NLRA], or 
[that] constitute[s] an unfair labor practice under § 8” falls 
within the scope of Garmon preemption.270  To fully 
understand how Garmon preemption operates, it is helpful to 
think of four categories of potential cases: those where the 
conduct involved in the dispute (1) is actually protected by 
section 7; (2) is actually prohibited by section 8 as an unfair 
labor practice; (3) is arguably protected by section 7; or (4) is 
arguably prohibited by section 8 as an unfair labor practice.271  
By definition, the first two categories fall within Garmon 
preemption absent some exception or the application of some 
of the limitations discussed in the following paragraphs.272  
Courts, however, do not apply Garmon preemption quite as 
rigidly when conduct prohibited by section 8 is involved.273 
The basic analysis for the third and fourth categories of 
cases operates in the same manner.  Whether the state law in 
question is one of broad “general application” or one 
“specifically directed towards the governance of industrial 
relations” is not dispositive in this preemption analysis.274  
However, common sense would dictate that the state law in 
question would more likely be preempted if it expressly 
governs labor relations.275  The key inquiry is whether the 
 
 268. See Drummonds, supra note 211, at 167; supra notes 262, 264–67 and 
accompanying text. 
 269. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 908. 
 270. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.  
 271. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 909–10 (using the same basic 
approach of further subdividing Garmon preemption into various categories). 
 272. See infra notes 274–84 and accompanying text. 
 273. See infra notes 280–82 and accompanying text. 
 274. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of 
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 197 (1978). 
 275. See id. at 197–98, 198 & n.27.  By the same token, laws of general 
applicability are less likely to generate rules or remedies which conflict with 
federal labor policy than the invocation of a special remedy under a state labor 
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controversy presented to the state court is identical to or 
different from that which could have been, but was not, 
presented to the NLRB.276  This rationale reflects the concern 
for protecting the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction.277  However, 
the primary jurisdiction rationale does not apply when the 
employee or union who could have presented the issue to the 
NLRB has not done so and the employer has no acceptable 
means of doing so.278  Nevertheless, preemption under these 
circumstances may in some cases still be necessary in the 
third category of cases.279 
The distinguishing factor between the third and fourth 
category is that courts are more willing to find preemption in 
the third category, a case where the conduct involved in the 
dispute is arguably protected by section 7.  “[C]onsiderations 
of federal supremacy . . . are implicated to a greater extent 
when labor-related activity is protected than when it is 
prohibited,” thus allowing a State more flexibility to exercise 
concurrent jurisdiction regarding conduct not protected by 
federal labor law.280  A greater need for preemption exists 
because permitting States to exercise jurisdiction in certain 
contexts might create a significant risk of misinterpretation 
of federal law and the consequent prohibition of protected 
conduct.281  Even when through gamesmanship a party avoids 
presenting an issue to the NLRB by trying to litigate the 
issue in other venues, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
Congress may in some cases have preferred the costs inherent 
in a jurisdictional hiatus as opposed to the frustration of 
national labor policy that might accompany the exercise of 
state jurisdiction.282 
There are some exceptions to Garmon preemption.  The 
Supreme Court has emphasized that courts should not apply 
Garmon inflexibly, particularly when “the State has a 
 
relations law.  See id. 
 276. See id. at 197. 
 277. See generally id. at 190–207.  
 278. See id.  This problem arises because only if the union files an unfair 
labor practice charge against the employer can the NLRB assess the scope of 
protection under section 7 of the NLRA.  See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra 
note 257, at 2357. 
 279. See infra note 282 and accompanying text. 
 280. Sears, 436 U.S. at 200. 
 281. See id. at 203. 
 282. See id. at 201–03. 
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substantial interest in regulation of the conduct at issue and 
the State’s interest is one that does not threaten undue 
interference with the federal regulatory scheme.”283  To 
determine whether to depart from Garmon preemption in a 
given case, courts take into account three factors: (1) whether 
the underlying conduct is protected under the NLRA; (2) 
whether there is an “overriding state interest” that is also 
“deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility”; and (3) 
whether a state cause of action would interfere with the 
effective administration of national labor policy.284 
2. Machinists Preemption 
Machinists preemption, on the other hand, implicates 
state regulation of conduct that Congress deems necessary to 
leave unregulated and rather left to the free play of economic 
forces.285  This doctrine mandates that States cannot regulate 
conduct that, even though it does not fall within the 
protection of section 7 or any prohibition of section 8 of the 
NLRA, Congress intended to be “unrestricted by any 
governmental power to regulate” since the conduct qualifies 
as a permissible economic weapon consistent with the scheme 
of labor regulation Congress adopted.286  Taking Machinists 
preemption together with Garmon preemption leads to the 
conclusion that Congress “has virtually banish[ed] states and 
localities from the field of labor relations.”287  Notable 
Supreme Court cases restricting a State’s ability to regulate 
conduct on the basis of Machinists preemption include 
preemption of state law regarding the ordering of union 
employees to cease and desist a concerted refusal to accept 
overtime assignments,288 the conditioning of a renewal of a 
franchise upon settlement of a labor dispute,289 and the  
prohibition of the use of state funds to promote or deter union 
 
 283. See id. at 188 (quoting Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners 
of Am. Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)). 
 284. See id. at 187–89. 
 285. See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. 
Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976). 
 286. See id. at 141 (quoting NLRB v. Ins. Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488–89 
(1960)). 
 287. Estlund, supra note 20, at 1572. 
 288. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140–41. 
 289. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 614 n.5 (1986). 
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organizing.290 
However, States do retain some authority to regulate 
activity more loosely related to labor-management relations.  
Examples of permissible state regulation of conduct or state 
conduct itself falling outside of both Garmon and Machinists 
preemption include: (1) state tort or breach of contract claims 
based on promises of permanent employment made by an 
employer hiring replacement workers during a labor strike;291 
(2) minimum state labor standards regarding the terms of 
employment;292 (3) state unemployment compensation 
schemes that impose additional waiting requirements for 
benefits when a person’s unemployment results from a labor 
dispute;293 and (4) situations where a State acts as a 
proprietor rather than as a regulator.294 
V. POTENTIAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW PROVIDING A 
RIGHT TO A SECRET BALLOT ELECTION 
Next, it is time to turn to the primary question raised in 
this Article, whether or not the state constitutional 
amendments protecting an employee’s right to a secret ballot 
election would be preempted under the NLRA.  In the letter 
the Acting General Counsel originally sent to the four 
Attorneys General to advise them that these constitutional 
amendments were preempted and in the complaint filed in 
Arizona district court, the NLRB stated its argument as to 
why these state constitutional amendments are preempted by 
the NLRA.295  The letter and the complaint made the same 
basic argument, but the letter went into more detail and 
pointed to the relevant cases that control this issue.296  In 
stating the legal basis for his position in this letter, the 
Acting General Counsel relied primarily upon Linden Lumber 
 
 290. See generally Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008). 
 291. See generally Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 500–06 (1983).  
 292. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 754–58 (1985). 
 293. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 537 (1979). 
 294. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & 
Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 227 (1993). 
 295. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 18, at 2–4; Letter 
from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel, NLRB, to Tom Horne, Ariz. 
Attorney Gen. 1–3 (Jan. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/letter_az.pdf; NLRB, 
supra note 9 (linking to each of the four letters).  
 296. See Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 295, at 1–2; Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment, supra note 18, at 2–4. 
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Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB297 and NLRB v. Gissel 
Packing Co.,298 two U.S. Supreme Court decisions.299  He 
argued that based on these decisions federal law provides 
employees two different paths to pursue their section 7 right 
to choose a bargaining representative, either through an 
NLRB conducted secret ballot election or voluntary 
recognition.300  He further concluded that the state 
constitutional amendments in question allow only secret 
ballot elections as a method of employees choosing union 
representation and thus are preempted by operation of the 
Supremacy Clause.301  The language of these state 
constitutional amendments directly seeks this result, so a 
further discussion of the specifics of each amendment is not 
necessary.302 
Looking to the applicable provisions of the NLRA and 
applying the relevant cases, the Acting General Counsel’s 
conclusion that these laws are preempted is quite persuasive.  
As he concluded, Linden Lumber and Gissel both contain the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that employees have 
two different paths to exercise their section 7 right to choose a 
bargaining representative.303  Section 7 clearly states, 
“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, [and] to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations . . . .”  Section 9(a) 
allows employees to exercise those section 7 rights by electing 
 
 297. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 301 (1974). 
 298. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
 299. See Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 295, at 1–2. 
 300. See id. at 2 (“The inevitable consequence of this Amendment is that 
Arizona employers are placed under direct state law pressure to refuse to 
recognize—or withdraw recognition from—any labor organization lacking an 
election victory.”).  The NLRB makes the same argument in the Arizona 
complaint.  See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 18, at 2–4 
(“The NLRA permits but does not require secret ballot elections for the 
designation, selection, or authorization of a collective bargaining representative 
where, for example, employees successfully petition their employer to 
voluntarily recognize their designated representative on the basis of reliable 
evidence of majority support, in accordance with Sections 7 and 9 of the 
NLRA . . . .”). 
 301. See Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 295, at 2. 
 302. See sources cited supra notes 4–7 (providing the language of each 
respective state constitutional amendment). 
 303. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304–06 
(1974) (“We recognized in Gissel that while the election process had 
acknowledged superiority in ascertaining whether a union has majority support, 
cards may ‘adequately reflect employee sentiment.’ ” ); Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596–
98. 
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or otherwise “designat[ing] or select[ing]” a representative.304  
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court has interpreted  
section 9(a) as authorizing voluntary recognition as a valid 
alternative to an NLRB conducted election.305  Of course, this 
right to use the voluntary recognition procedure has its basis 
only as a statutory right that Congress could amend or do 
away with as it pleases.306  However, until Congress does so 
or the Supreme Court interprets section 9(a) differently, 
Linden Lumber and Gissel stand as the definitive 
interpretation of section 9(a).  Thus, the labor policy at issue 
is clear and must now be put in the context of the relevant 
preemption doctrines. 
Garmon preemption is the preemption doctrine 
implicated by these state constitutional amendments that 
protect the right to a secret ballot election.  By their very 
nature, Garmon preemption and Machinists preemption will 
rarely apply to the same set of facts unless it is unclear 
whether the conduct at issue is protected by section 7 or 
prohibited by section 8.307  Garmon preemption focuses on 
conduct protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 while 
Machinists preemption instead looks at conduct neither 
protected nor prohibited by these sections but still outside the 
scope of permissible state regulation.308  Looking to the 
specific rights at issue leads to the conclusion that Garmon is 
the relevant preemption doctrine.  First, the Supreme Court 
has already concluded that the conduct at issue is protected 
by section 7 of the NLRA, which by definition makes the issue 
fall within Garmon preemption.309  Second, Garmon 
preemption focuses on issues “plainly within the central aim 
of federal regulation” that the NLRB should determine in the 
first instance.310  Machinists preemption instead focuses more 
on issues that do not fall within the core of the NLRA scheme, 
specifically economic weapons neither expressly allowed nor 
prohibited under the NLRA that the States still do not have 
 
 304. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159(a) (2006). 
 305. See supra Part I.A. 
 306. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 
 307. See supra Part IV.D. 
 308. See supra Part IV.D. 
 309. See supra Part IV.D; supra note 303. 
 310. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union Local 2020 v. 
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959). 
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the ability to regulate.311  The scope of employee rights to 
select a bargaining representative, a central issue in the 
NLRA framework of labor and management relations, more 
clearly falls within the concerns of Garmon preemption.312  
The process of selecting a bargaining representative is 
likewise not an economic weapon.313 
Applying Garmon to these state constitutional 
amendments leads to the conclusion that these state 
constitutional amendments would be preempted.  Putting this 
question into the context of the four categories of Garmon 
preemption cases discussed earlier in Part IV.D.1, a case 
involving this particular question would fall into the first 
category, conduct that is actually protected by section 7 of the 
NLRA.  Employees taking advantage of the process of 
voluntary recognition to organize in the form of a labor union 
is protected by section 7 of the NLRA.314  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has expressly recognized this fact in two decisions, 
Linden Lumber and Gissel.315  A greater need for preemption 
exists when labor-related activity is protected under the 
NLRA rather than prohibited by it.316 
Looking at the strength of this particular preemption 
argument, it is relatively clear that the processes through 
which employees choose their bargaining representative falls 
“plainly within the central aim of federal regulation.”317  Here, 
several states are attempting to modify the exercise of 
employees’ section 7 right to select a bargaining 
representative, labor-related activity that is protected under 
the NLRA.318  One of the NLRB’s key functions is to conduct 
union representation procedures and resolve disputes that 
arise out of them.319  Allowing states to dictate what rules the 
NLRB must follow in a particular state on questions of union 
representation would completely disrupt the NLRB’s primary 
 
 311. See supra Part IV.B. 
 312. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. 
 313. See supra Part IV.B. 
 314. See sources cited supra note 303. 
 315. See sources cited supra note 303. 
 316. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of 
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 200 (1978); supra notes 280–282 and accompanying 
text.  
 317. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. 
 318. See id.; sources cited supra notes 4–7 (containing the text of the state 
constitutional amendments at issue). 
 319. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006). 
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jurisdiction over these kinds of issues.320 
Furthermore, the right to choose a representative for 
employees is one of the first rights enumerated in NLRA 
section 7, the key source of employees’ right to organize under 
the NLRA.321  Additionally, the right of employees to choose a 
representative is subject to extensive regulation by Congress 
and the NLRB as evidenced by the level of detail in section 9 
of the NLRB that deals with NLRB election procedures322 as 
well as existing and proposed NLRB regulations that regulate 
this process.323  The rights employees may exercise and 
procedures they must follow when selecting a bargaining 
representative are core aspects of the NLRA.324  Permitting 
these state constitutional amendments to coexist with the 
NLRA would create “too great a danger of conflict between 
the power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by 
state law.”325 
None of the factors courts utilize to determine whether to 
depart from Garmon preemption under a particular set of 
circumstances weigh in favor of an exception to preemption 
here.326  The three factors are as follows: (1) whether the 
underlying conduct is protected under the NLRA; (2) whether 
there is an “overriding state interest” that is also “deeply 
rooted in local feeling and responsibility”; and (3) whether a 
state cause of action would interfere with the effective 
administration of national labor policy.327  First, the 
underlying conduct, employees taking advantage of the 
process of voluntary recognition to organize in the form of a 
labor union, is protected under the NLRA as discussed in the 
previous paragraphs.  It is necessary to distinguish the 
Supreme Court decision Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant 
Employees Local 54 where the Court stated that the section 7 
right to select bargaining representatives is not absolute and 
 
 320. See supra Part IV.D.1. 
 321. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
 322. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
 323. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 101–02 (2011); supra Part I.C. 
 324. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 
Millmen’s Union Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959). 
 325. Garmon, 359 U.S at 244. 
 326. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local 25, 
430 U.S. 290, 298 (1977).  
 327. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 
436 U.S. 180, 199–00 (1978).  
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that some state law on the issue may permissibly exist due to 
some federal statutory exclusions.328  That decision dealt with 
some relatively narrow issues, the qualifications and 
responsibilities of union officials.329  Brown did not deal with 
the basic procedures employees may use to select a 
bargaining representative, an NLRB conducted election, or 
voluntary recognition.330  Therefore, it is unlikely that Brown 
would foreclose a finding of preemption under these 
circumstances.331 
Second, no such overriding state interest deeply rooted in 
local feeling and responsibility exists.  Federal regulation of 
union representation procedures has taken place to some 
extent since World War I and comprehensively starting in 
1933.332  Given this lengthy history of federal regulation of 
union representation procedures, it is difficult to articulate a 
plausible “overriding state interest” that is “deeply rooted in 
local feeling and responsibility.”333  Furthermore, the timing 
of the passage of these state constitutional amendments as 
well as the currency of the controversies over voluntary 
recognition, the Dana Corp. decision, and the potential 
passage of the EFCA undercut the argument that this issue 
has historically been one of state concern.334 
Third, a state cause of action for violation of a state right 
to a secret ballot election in a union election would interfere 
with the effective administration of national labor policy.335  If 
these state constitutional amendments were given effect, it is 
entirely conceivable that parties would seek to battle out 
these issues in state courts rather than before the NLRB in 
order to circumvent the terms of the NLRA itself and federal 
precedent interpreting the NLRA.  It might even be possible 
that a state agency would attempt to enforce these laws 
against the NLRB in a way that would require the NLRB to 
follow state law when certifying a union under the NLRA.  
 
 328. See Brown v. Rest. Emps. and Bartenders Int’l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 
491, 506 (1984). 
 329. See id. at 504–09. 
 330. See id. at 509.  
 331. See id.  
 332. See supra Part IV.A. 
 333. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local 25, 
430 U.S. 290, 298 (1977). 
 334. See id.; supra Part Introduction–I.A–B, II–III. 
 335. See Farmer, 430 U.S. at 298; supra Part I.A.  
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This type of situation would be one that would interfere with 
the effective administration of national labor policy, as it 
would hamper the NLRB in carrying out one of its basic 
functions.336 
The law in this area has enough clarity that it is this 
author’s position that the NLRB will succeed in its actions 
against any of these four states on the issue of whether these 
state constitutional amendments are preempted.  One must 
always remember that preemption in the field of labor law 
goes further than in most every other area of law.337  Given 
the breadth of labor preemption, it is difficult to make a 
convincing case that these state constitutional amendments 
that impact such a central issue in the NLRA statutory 
scheme can survive the NLRA’s broad preemptive effect. 
CONCLUSION 
Putting aside the controversy over the EFCA, Dana 
Corp., and voluntary recognition in general, the preemption 
issue regarding these state constitutional amendments is 
relatively straightforward.  Furthermore, any other result 
would undermine the benefits that preemption provides in 
the area of labor law.  Given the politically polarizing nature 
of labor policy, it is not a stretch of the imagination to predict 
that States would adopt wildly disparate labor standards on a 
countless range of issues if the NLRA did not preempt laws 
such as these state constitutional amendments.  The 
resulting hodgepodge of laws from the States would carry 
with them the cost of confusion in trying to comply with the 
law, constant change from fifty different legislatures and 
court systems, and inconsistency in management and 
workers’ rights.338  The current system, while certainly not 
perfect, avoids many of these problems that would hurt both 
management and labor unions.  The United States would be a 
less favorable business climate to domestic and foreign 
businesses absent the NLRA’s preemptive effects. 
The controversial nature of these topics does reveal, 
however, the deeply rooted politicization that has taken hold 
of federal and state labor policy.  While broad preemption 
 
 336. See sources cited supra note 335. 
 337. See supra Part IV.C–D. 
 338. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
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does result in consistency and uniformity in the field of labor 
law, some commentators argue that the entire area of law has 
stagnated because of it.339  They have proposed that the 
States should play a larger part in the formation of labor 
policy because of the NLRB’s ineffectiveness at administering 
the federal labor law scheme and the constant Congressional 
turmoil over labor policy.340  Likewise, the NLRB itself has 
been continually criticized for reversing its prior decisions for 
questionable reasons arguably motivated more by politics 
than policy.341  This general situation undermines the benefits 
of consistency and uniformity that federal preemption should 
help achieve.  Some of these problems may be an unavoidable 
part of the political process, but labor law nonetheless ranks 
near the top of the list as one of the most politically 
controversial areas of law.  While such a climate may 
ultimately result in more gains for management or for labor, 




 339. See, e.g., Drummonds, supra note 211, at 97–103; Estlund, supra note 
20, at 1527–31. 
 340. See sources cited supra note 339. 
 341. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A 
Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 163–69 (1985). 
 342. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 86–87. 
